



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


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5. France-Algeria: Gaullist party spokesman proposes as possible trial balloon permanent partition in Algeria. (*Page iii*)

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9. Dominican Republic: Military officers, angered by Balaguer's 2 October address to UN, again considering a coup. (*Page vi*)

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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Syria: There appear to be indications of some friction between the Syrian revolutionary command and Premier Kuzbari's civilian cabinet. On Thursday evening, in response to Nasir's relatively conciliatory speech, Kuzbari released a statement expressing the hope for friendly relations with the Egyptians "on a new basis of fraternity" and declaring that Syria would proceed with elections as soon as possible. Several hours later, however, the Syrian minister of information called in newspapermen and told them that Kuzbari

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had made no such statement. Friday morning, Damascus radio broadcast a sharply different Kuzbari statement, attacking Nasir on many counts and claiming that Nasir had "backed down," having "finally come to realize the failure of his policy in Syria." In a press interview broadcast on Wednesday by Damascus radio, a member of the revolutionary command stressed that the revolutionary movement had been planned and executed by the military officers alone and that there had not been "the slightest relation between the army uprising and any politician or civilian official."

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Dissension at the top levels of the new Syrian government would be particularly serious at this stage, in view of the pressures that may soon be exerted by less conservative political elements and in view of the campaign of subversion which Nasir has begun.

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France-Algeria: A Gaullist party spokesman, in what may be a trial balloon, has proposed some form of permanent partition as the best solution attainable in Algeria.

Alain Peyrefitte, a National Assembly deputy who is considered an intellectual leader of the Union for the New Republic party (UNR), argues in a recent series of articles in the Paris daily Le Monde that rebel reluctance to give effective guarantees to the Europeans rules out the possibility of a negotiated settlement and that the "repatriation" of the Europeans is morally, politically, and economically undesirable. He would divide Algeria now into three autonomous regions: one French, one Moslem, and the Sahara, with their eventual relationship to be determined when tempers are cooler. He estimates that less than a million people would have to be moved and notes that this is less than half those already displaced in Algeria. o/c

The Algerian rebel regime has consistently repudiated the idea of partition. French spokesmen in the past have also tended

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to dismiss permanent partition as not feasible, but the proposal may now have considerable appeal to De Gaulle because it satisfies the army's objection to abandoning Algeria and fulfills France's moral commitments to the Europeans who want to remain in Algeria.

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
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
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Dominican Republic: President Balaguer's 2 October
address before the UN General Assembly has angered many Dominican military officers and has led some of them again to consider a military coup. The address, a plea for world understanding of his democratization program and for the lifting of OAS sanctions against his regime, contained strong criticisms of the late dictator. The American military liaison officers in the Dominican Republic report that reaction among the officers is widespread that the President pulled the rug out from under them. Convinced, probably accurately, that the speech had been cleared with General Ramfis Trujillo, they are critical of Ramfis' having permitted public "abuse" of his late father. Some of them say that Ramfis is preparing to save himself and his personal clique and leave the rest of the officers in the country to "bear the brunt of the people's wrath." Many Dominican officers are convinced that Balaguer's policies are leading toward an opposition-controlled regime and that

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
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the restoration of a military dictatorship is the only way to
save themselves from losing everything. [REDACTED]

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SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during recent weeks)

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Strength and deployment of Soviet long-range ballistic mis-
sile forces. U.S.I.B. NIE 11-8/1-61. Sept 21'61. 142394. [REDACTED]

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Nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities of Free World
countries other than the US and UK. U.S.I.B. NIE 4-3-61.
Sept 21'61. [REDACTED]

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Situation and short-run outlook in Laos: political prospects;
military situation and capabilities. U.S.I.B. SNIE 58-3-61.
Sept 28'61. [REDACTED]

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Communist China in 1971: estimate of China's position as a world power based upon its probable political, economic, scientific, and military strengths and weaknesses; likely trends in Sino-Soviet relations. U.S.I.B. SNIE 13-2-61. Sept 28'61.

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French Partition Plan for Algeria

Peyrefitte, who accurately assessed in advance De Gaulle's policy on European integration, claims to offer a program which will permit France to withdraw politically, militarily, and financially from Algeria without renouncing its obligations to either Europeans or pro-French Moslems. He argues that the Europeans in Algeria have as much right as the Moslems to remain there, and that their "collective personality" is sufficiently distinct to warrant political separation from France. Passions are too inflamed to permit consideration of a single independent Algeria; therefore the two peoples entitled to live in Algeria should be allowed to organize their own governments, the French in the western areas where they are now concentrated, and the Moslems in the east. Individuals would be free to live in either area as long as they accepted the rule of the majority in the state they chose.

Peyrefitte hopes the PAG will eventually accept a federal relationship binding the two coastal regions with the Sahara in a state entirely independent of France. Failing such an accommodation, the three autonomous regions would become independent states, each with UN membership. He argues that strict adherence to self-determination would still international objections, citing the various postwar examples of partition.

He argues that the French Government now is in a position to impose such a partition plan. He assumes that the FLN would then return to a relatively orthodox military organization operating on its own territory and that the French Army would be able to cope with it more readily than at present when the bulk of FLN forces are on Tunisian soil.

Peyrefitte insists his plan is applicable within the framework De Gaulle has indicated, and that it would spare the army and the French public the shame of betraying a trust. He is also addressing the PAG, however, stressing that negotiations


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are necessary and that wide leeway is possible in seeking a solution which would permit the two peoples to share a joint fatherland.

These proposals will probably arouse considerable support in France, particularly as the government proceeds with plans for a 50,000-man Algerian police force of which Moslems will predominate and of which one fourth eventually would be organized military units of the FLN. Consul General Porter in Algiers questions whether Paris has thought out the implications of this policing plan, which will expose the new police force to strong nationalist influence. He cites postwar Syria, where French-led Moslem troops deserted en masse on contact with the nationalists.

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Dominican Military Still Restive

President Balaguer has repeatedly stated his conviction that General Ramfis Trujillo is the only person capable of controlling the armed forces during the present crucial period. General Trujillo privately indicated to the American consul general last month that the Dominican military had twice last summer been on the verge of seizing the government. He implied that his own persuasion prevented the action.

25X1 [] General Trujillo's pledge, in an unpublicized letter to the OAS subcommittee, to resign immediately upon the lifting of the OAS diplomatic and economic sanctions, has apparently not yet been made known to the officer corps. When this does become known, many officers are likely to regard it as "desertion" by Trujillo and a capitulation to the demands of the opposition. There would then be even stronger sentiment for a coup by officers convinced that such a move is dictated by interests of self preservation. Trujillo, however, has [] [] expressed confidence that he could retire in "a few months" after he has implemented a program of retirements and other changes in the military.

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General Fernando Sanchez, nominally chief of the air force and actually Trujillo's chief of staff and closest aide, is apparently being groomed for the top armed forces job. Sanchez is regarded by the American military liaison officers as quite capable of engineering a coup. It is possible that Sanchez may lead a military move against the government, conceivably with the support of General Trujillo if the latter becomes convinced that this is the only way to preserve armed forces unity. The American military liaison officers noted on 4 October that increased police patrols have been seen in the capital this week and that the military airlift capability at the key base near the capital has recently been augmented. They find it impossible to evaluate whether the threat of a military coup is real or whether these indications are part of a military pressure tactic, but conclude that the situation is ominous. [] []

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